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[R]ationis ordinatio ad bonum commune, ab eo qui curam communitatis
habet, promulgata.1
I. INTRODUCTION
The Constitution is the focus of sustained academic, political, and public debate.
This is due, in large measure, to its central place in American public life. The
Constitution is a—if not the2—major source of America’s identity3; it is the ultimate
*

Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law.

1

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE I-II, Q. 90, a. 4 (Leoninum Romae 1892).

2

The Declaration of Independence is the other potential primary source of American
identity. This position has a wide following. See, e.g., SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, TO SECURE
THESE RIGHTS: THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
22 (1992) (providing the best defense of this view); Scott Douglas Gerber, Liberal
Originalism: The Declaration of Independence and Constitutional Interpretation, 63 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. (forthcoming Nov. 2014).
3

See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 11 (1988) (“‘Veneration’ of the
Constitution has become a central, even if sometimes challenged, aspect of the American
political tradition.”).
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arbiter of many of the nation’s most pressing legal and social issues; it is the trump
card in political debates. The viewpoint, argument, or perspective that has the
Constitution as its ally, wins.4
The Constitution’s centrality makes correctly ascertaining its meaning crucially
important. Hence, it is no surprise that constitutional interpretation has taken center
stage throughout American history. The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
Constitution has been, from the Republic’s dawn, continuously subject to praise and
criticism.5 And outside the courts, Americans from the beginning have harnessed
different constitutional interpretations to support their respective positions.6
Constitutional interpretation has been especially contentious in American law and
politics since the Progressive Era,7 and has remained so to today.
Broadly speaking, and for a host of reasons,8 since the Warren Court, two camps
of constitutional interpretation have emerged: originalists and nonoriginalists.9
Nonoriginalism includes a diverse collection of scholars who argue that factors other
4

From a popular constitutionalist perspective, this claim is tautologically true because, so
long as a popular constitutional movement is successful, its constitutional interpretation
is/becomes the Constitution. Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV.
1737, 1752 (2007); see also JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 3 (2011) (arguing that
popular constitutionalism occurs within the context of constitutional construction).
5
An early example of this is the issue of state immunity from suit, or the lack thereof, in
Article III. This issue quickly reached the Supreme Court in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2
Dall.) 419 (1793), and, after the Court’s ruling, swiftly resulted in the Eleventh Amendment in
1795.
6
See, e.g., THE KENTUCKY AND VIRGINIA RESOLUTIONS OF 1798 (1798), reprinted in
DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 178 (Henry Steele Commager ed., 7th ed. 1963) (arguing
that the Alien and Sedition Acts violated the principle of limited and enumerated powers and
the First Amendment); REPUBLICAN PARTY PLATFORM (1860), reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF
AMERICAN HISTORY 363-64 (rejecting the Dred Scott Court’s interpretation of the
Constitution).
7
See, e.g., JOHNATHAN O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 28-39 (2005) (describing the intellectual ferment during the
Progressive and New Deal periods that spilled over into jurisprudence and resulted in the
rejection of originalism); CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW: FROM
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION TO JUDGE-MADE LAW 205-40 (rev. ed. 1994) (arguing that
modern judicial review arose during the Progressive Era).
8
See Lee J. Strang, Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism?: Theoretical Possibilities
and Practical Differences, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 279-91 (2011) (providing three such
reasons); see also Lawrence B. Solum, The Positive Foundations of Formalism: False
Necessity and American Legal Realism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2464, 2496 (2014) (book review)
(“In the late twentieth century, an alternative jurisprudential gestalt began to emerge. The
alternative gestalt embraced the rule of law as a central value and questioned both the
desirability and inevitability of instrumentalist approaches to judging. Originalism emerged as
a rival to living constitutionalism.”).
9

See Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 241
(2009) (“For the last several decades, the primary divide in American constitutional theory has
been between those theorists who label themselves as ‘originalists’ and those who do not.”).
Nonoriginalists also frequently receive the label living constitutionalists. See, e.g., Ethan J.
Leib, The Perpetual Anxiety of Living Constitutionalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 353 (2007)
(contrasting with originalism, living constitutionalism).
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than, or in addition to, the Constitution’s original meaning should govern
constitutional interpretation.10 Most legal academics are nonoriginalists. 11
Originalists, especially since the mid-1980s,12 have elaborated an elegant theory13
of interpretation that focuses on the Constitution’s original meaning. Originalism
has, over the past two decades, gained many prominent proponents on the bench and
in the academy, and originalists have provided a variety of powerful justifications for
originalism ranging across the philosophical spectrum.14 For instance, Professor
Randy Barnett argued that originalism best protects individual natural rights in his
well-received Restoring the Lost Constitution: The Presumption of Liberty.15
Along the way, originalism has matured in response to robust criticism. For
example, originalism shifted focus from originally intended meaning to original
public meaning, in order to overcome criticism that the Framers’ and Ratifiers’
intentions either did not exist or were inaccessible.16
Being new to the debates over constitutional interpretation, I came with “fresh
eyes” to the subject of constitutional interpretation.17 I found that many criticisms of
originalism contained significant truth. Consequently, my own scholarship has
frequently been devoted to elaborating an originalism that responds to these
reasonable criticisms. This scholarly trajectory has led me to identify some of
originalism’s limits.
A good example is my article, An Originalist Theory of Precedent: Originalism,
Nonoriginalist Precedent, and the Common Good.18 There, I incorporated the insight
of nonoriginalist critics that originalism should not lead to the overruling of all

10

See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 11-22 (1991) (providing the
seminal list of six modalities of constitutional interpretation); RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S
LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 11 (1996) (arguing that
constitutional interpretation includes a justification facet that requires use of non-legal
reasoning).
11

Strang, Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism?, supra note 8, at 287-88.

12
See Lawrence B. Solum, What is Originalism?: The Evolution of Contemporary
Originalist Theory, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 12, 13-27 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011) (describing
originalism’s intellectual history).
13

Or family of theories. See id. at 32-38 (describing the fixation and contribution theses).

14

Lee J. Strang, Originalism and the Aristotelian Tradition: Virtue’s Home in
Originalism, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1997, 2013-14 (2012).
15

RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING
LIBERTY 4-5 (2004).

THE

LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION

OF

16
See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L.
REV. 204, 214-18 (1980) (providing the seminal articulation of this criticism); see also Solum,
supra note 12, at 16-27 (describing some of originalism’s changes).
17

Though I possessed philosophical and religious commitments that provided input and
boundaries to my permissible conceptions of constitutional interpretation. For instance, both
my religious and philosophical loyalties committed me to (a conception of) natural law.
18

Lee J. Strang, An Originalist Theory of Precedent: Originalism, Nonoriginalist
Precedent, and the Common Good, 36 N.M. L. REV. 419, 419 (2006).
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nonoriginalist precedent.19 I argued that originalism required federal judges to give
“significant respect” to constitutional precedent, including nonoriginalist precedent.20
In this same vein, much of my scholarship has explained how originalism meets the
various criticisms that have been leveled against it and, in doing so, how originalism
itself is made better.21
At the same time, I believe, originalism’s promise remains. Originalism’s
promise is three-fold. First, originalism promises that it can paint constitutional
interpretation in the most normatively attractive light. Not ideal results. Instead—on
balance and systemically—normatively more attractive results than its competitors.
Second, originalism promises that constitutional interpretation can fit the key facets
of our Constitution. These key facets include, for example, the Constitution’s
writtenness and its particular origins, facets that originalism better fits than
alternative methods of constitutional interpretation. Third, originalism promises that
constitutional interpretation can respect judges’ capacities. Judges’ pivotal role
necessitates that interpretative methodologies work with their capacities, which
originalism does, better than nonoriginalism.
In this Symposium Essay, I summarize originalism’s promise and limits. Part II
succinctly explains originalism’s promise. Part III briefly describes originalism’s
limits. Part IV then suggests that originalism’s limits contribute to its promise.
II. ORIGINALISM’S PROMISES
A. Introduction
Originalism makes three promises that, together, make originalism attractive, or
at least more attractive than alternatives. These promises together constitute
originalism’s claim that constitutional interpretation is most legitimate when it is
performed via originalism.
B. Originalism Promises to Paint Constitutional Interpretation in a
More Normatively Attractive Light
1. Introduction
First, consistently used, originalism promises to paint constitutional
interpretation in the most normatively attractive light possible or, at least, that
originalism leads to more normatively attractive results than alternative methods.
19

This was one of Brest’s criticisms. Brest, supra note 16, at 223-24, 230-31. It was also
pervasive in the literature critical of originalism. Strang, Originalism, Nonoriginalist
Precedent, and the Common Good, supra note 18, at 430-31.
20
Strang, Originalism, Nonoriginalist Precedent, and the Common Good, supra note 18,
at 447.
21

See Strang, Originalism and the Aristotelian Tradition, supra note 14, at 1997 (arguing
that originalism’s theoretical transformation did not undermine it because originalism can
incorporate virtue ethics); Lee J. Strang, An Originalist Theory of Precedent: The Privileged
Place of Originalist Precedent, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1729, 1731 (2010) (arguing that
originalism holds a robust place for the practice of precedent and therefore adequately fits
existing American legal practice); Lee J. Strang, Originalism and the “Challenge of Change”:
Abduced-Principle Originalism and Other Mechanisms by Which Originalism Sufficiently
Accommodates Changed Social Conditions, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 927. 927-29 (2009) (arguing
that originalism can meet the challenge of changed societal conditions).
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Since the publication of Professor Keith Whittington’s Constitutional
Interpretation,22 in 1999, originalists have proposed normative justifications for
originalism that cover the figurative waterfront. In other words, originalists have
provided arguments from the major possible justificatory perspectives. These
normative groundings fall into two main categories: internal and external
justifications.23 I describe each, in turn.
2. Internal Justifications
Internal justifications take the widely-accepted facets of American constitutional
practice for granted and argue that originalism matches those practices better than
alternative interpretative methodologies. Internal justifications do not attempt to
justify the key practices of American constitutional interpretation; instead, the
practices are “given.” The goal of internal justifications is to make originalism
relatively more attractive by showing its close fit to those practices.
For instance, Whittington argued that the fact that the Constitution is written
suggests that originalism is the proper means of constitutional interpretation while, at
the same time, excluding other modes of interpretation.24 Whittington’s argument
was similar to Barnett’s contention that the Constitution’s “writtenness” serves four
functions: evidentiary, cautionary, channeling, and clarifying.25 Only originalism,
Barnett contended, could facilitate these four functions.26 Therefore, the
Constitution’s writtenness warrants originalism.
Professor Lawrence Solum utilized Gricean philosophy of language to conclude
that the Constitution’s text’s meaning is its semantic meaning, which, in turn, is its
original meaning.27 According to Solum, the fact that the Constitution is a written
communication to the public selects originalism as the appropriate interpretative
methodology.28
Professors McGinnis and Rappaport recently tied originalism to the structural
mechanism of the Constitution’s original adoption and adoption of subsequent
amendments via supermajoritarian means.29 Their argument was anchored to the

22

KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING,
ORIGINAL INTENT, & JUDICIAL REVIEW 110 (1999); see also ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 9, 17, 46 (1997) (identifying democracy, the
Rule of Law, and negative consequences, as reasons to reject nonoriginalism).
23

WHITTINGTON, supra note 22, at 110; see also RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY 106-07 (1977) (articulating the analogous categories of fit and justification).
24

WHITTINGTON, supra note 22, at 50.

25

BARNETT, supra note 15, at 100-03.

26

Id. at 103-09.

27

See Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism, at 34 (Nov. 22, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1120244 [hereinafter Solum, Semantic Originalism] (relying
on PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS (1989)); see also Lawrence B. Solum,
Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479, 489 (2013) (same).
28

Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 27, at 5, 50-57.

29

JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD
CONSTITUTION 62-80 (2013). McGinnis and Rappaport also provided an external justification
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Constitution’s key adoption provisions, Articles VII and V, which require two-thirds
and three-fourths of states, respectively, to adopt and amend the constitution.30
Perhaps most focused on a taken-for-granted facet of our constitutional practice
is Professor Christopher Green’s claim that the Constitution’s text itself identified
originalism as the proper interpretative methodology.31 Green argued that the
Constitution’s repeated use of indexicals—for example, references to itself such as
“this Constitution”—shows that the referenced Constitution is a text whose meaning
was fixed at the time of ratification.32 Green then coupled this move with the
Supremacy Clause, to argue that the Constitution’s original meaning the “supreme
Law of the Land.”33
3. External Justifications
External justifications argue that originalism will lead to a good state of affairs,
or a better state of affairs than other interpretative methods.34 Here, originalists have
offered a broad array of arguments.
Professor Barnett, for instance, contended that originalism best protects natural
rights. It does so through two steps. First, the Constitution’s original meaning is
rights protective. This follows, according to Barnett, from the federal government’s
limited and enumerated powers, coupled with the rule of construction—a
“presumption of liberty”—against rights-infringement located in the Ninth
Amendment (and the Privileges or Immunities Clause).35 However, if judges were
free to depart from this rights-protective original meaning, then the Constitution’s
protection of natural rights would falter. Therefore, Barnett argued that originalism is
necessary to “lock-in” the Constitution’s rights-protectiveness.36
Whittington argued that originalism best facilitates popular sovereignty.37 It does
so in two primary ways: first, originalism facilitates popular sovereignty by
protecting the constitutional judgments of the American people, embodied in the
Constitution, from judicial abrogation38; and, second, originalism incentivizes the

for originalism. See id. at 81-99 (arguing that originalism is normatively attractive because it
creates the best interpretative consequences).
30

U.S. CONST. art. V; id. art. VII.

31

Christopher R. Green, “This Constitution”: Constitutional Indexicals as a Basis for
Textualist Semi-Originalism, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1607, 1607-14 (2009).
32

Id. at 1614.

33

Id. at 1610-12, 1614.

34

See Cass R. Sunstein, There is Nothing that Interpretation Just Is,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2489088 (last visited Oct. 2, 2014)
(arguing that “[a]ny approach [to constitutional interpretation] must be defended on normative
grounds”).
35

BARNETT, supra note 15, at 253-69, 274-77.

36

Id. at 105-06.

37

WHITTINGTON, supra note 22, at 111.

38

Id.
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American people to exercise popular sovereignty by preserving a space for their
constitutionally-embodied constitutional judgments.39
Most recently, Professors McGinnis and Rappaport provided a third major
argument: that originalism provides for the best consequences.40 McGinnis and
Rappaport argued that, on balance, constitutional decisions made by supermajority
are generally superior to judgments made through other decision processes, in
particular majority vote.41 Supermajorities adopted and amended the Constitution,
and these supermajorities of Americans understood the meaning of the texts they
ratified using originalism.42 Therefore, originalism is necessary to preserve the
meaning that emerged from these valuable supermajority processes.
4. Originalism Facilitates Human Flourishing
My own justification for originalism follows a similar two-pronged path:
Originalism best fits the widely-accepted facets of our constitutional practice, and it
also leads to a the best set of conditions for human flourishing for Americans today.
My conception of originalism is drawn from the Aristotelian philosophical
tradition.43 My conception assumes that the Aristotelian philosophical tradition’s
description of reality—in particular, its description of human beings, law, and
society—is accurate, and applies its concepts to the United States Constitution.
Three fundamental components of the Aristotelian philosophical tradition are
needed for purposes of this brief Essay: human flourishing, virtue, and law. Human
flourishing is when a human possesses deep, abiding, happiness.44 One flourishes
when one reasonably participates in the basic human goods, such as life, knowledge,

39

Id.

40

MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 29, at 19-20.

41

Id. at 33-61.

42

Id. at 62-80.

43

The Aristotelian philosophical tradition is the tradition of philosophical inquiry that
includes Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas as the central figures. See Strang, Originalism and
the Aristotelian Tradition, supra note 14, at 2015-16 (briefly summarizing the tradition); Lee
J. Strang, The Clash of Rival and Incompatible Philosophical Traditions Within Constitutional
Interpretation: Originalism Grounded in the Central Western Philosophical Tradition, 28
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 909, 916-28 (2005) (providing a first-cut explanation of the pertinent
facets of the tradition); see also ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, GOD, PHILOSOPHY, UNIVERSITIES: A
SELECTIVE HISTORY OF THE CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITION (2009) (describing a
tradition that includes the Aristotelian tradition, but which is broader).
44
See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1098a, (D.P. Chase, trans., 1947) (“[T]he Good
of Man comes to be ‘a working of the Soul in the way of Excellence,’ . . . in the way of the
best and most perfect Excellence.”); ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, at Q. 5, a. 5
(Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros., 1947) (“Imperfect
happiness that can be had in this life, can be acquired by man by his natural powers, in the
same way as virtue, in whose operation it consists.”); JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND
NATURAL RIGHTS 103 (1980) (describing happiness as the reasonable participation in the basic
human goods).
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and friendship.45 One’s life will be less rich, less full, for instance, if one does not
engage in friendships.46
Virtue is both constitutive of human flourishing and a mechanism to pursue
flourishing.47 Virtue is part-and-parcel of human flourishing because the good life
includes virtuous activity. For instance, the good life does not include timidity or
rashness; instead, to be happy, one must take (only) reasonable risks.48 Virtue is also
a means to secure flourishing, because the virtues hone one’s capacities to identify
the basic human goods and to reasonably pursue those goods. For example,
temperance enables one to reasonably pursue money and to not let desire for any one
(created) good unreasonably dominate one’s life.49
Law is one of the key mechanisms that humans utilize to achieve human
flourishing. For a host of reasons,50 humans must utilize law to set the background
conditions—the common good—that make it possible for humans to flourish.51 To
take an example from the first-year law school curriculum: private property is
(generally) necessary for human flourishing,52 but there is no one-size-fits-all private
property law scheme.53 Therefore, human societies utilize law to construct a
reasonable set of property law doctrines.54
Turning to the United States Constitution, my account of originalism fits a
number of the Constitution’s facets. For instance, the Constitution set out its purpose
in the Preamble.55 The Preamble identified the Constitution’s purposes in terms of
45
See JOHN FINNIS, AQUINAS 107-08 (1998) (describing St. Thomas’ explanation of
happiness).
46

See JANE AUSTEN, MANSFIELD PARK 101, 104 (1906) (describing Fanny Price being left
“all alone” on the Sotherton estate as a metaphor for her loneliness caused by lack of
friendships); VICTOR HUGO, LES MISÉRABLES (1862) (describing Javert’s life as one of
“privations, isolation, self-denial, and chastity— never any amusement”).
47

See Strang, Originalism and the Aristotelian Tradition, supra note 14, at 2022-24
(describing this relationship).
48

See HUGO, supra note 46 (describing Jean Valjean’s courageous pursuit of redemption);
SIGRID UNDSET, KRISTIN LAVRANSDATTER 1920-22 (2005) (describing Kristin’s rash romance
with and marriage to Erlend Nikulausson, and its negative effects).
49

See CHARLES DICKENS, A CHRISTMAS CAROL 2 (2009) (“Scrooge! a squeezing,
wrenching, grasping, scraping, clutching, covetous, old sinner!”).
50

YVES SIMON, A GENERAL THEORY OF AUTHORITY 47 (1962); YVES R. SIMON,
PHILOSOPHY OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT 59 (1951); see also SCOTT SHAPIRO, LEGALITY
131-34, 161-63 (2011) (describing reasons for humans’ resort to legality).
51

FINNIS, supra note 45, at 155.

52

ST. THOMAS, supra note 1, at I-II, Q. 66, a. 2.

53

See id. (“[T]he division of possessions is not according to the natural law, but rather
arose from human agreement which belongs to positive law.”).
54

This creative use of positive law is what St. Thomas labeled “determinatio.” Id. at I-II,
Q. 91, a. 3.
55

U.S. CONST. pmbl; see also JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
UNITED STATES §§ 218-19 (reprint ed. 1987) (1833) (describing the Preamble as the “key
to open the mind of the makers”).

THE
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the American People’s common good, a concept at home in the Aristotelian
philosophical tradition,56 but harder to square with other conceptions of
originalism.57
My conception of originalism also offers a normatively attractive external
justification for originalism. Originalism, on my account, provides two
complimentary arguments, one “thin” and one “thick.”58 The thin argument is
relatively independent of controversial claims regarding the Good, while the thicker
argument relies on the Aristotelian tradition’s conception of human flourishing.
The thin account argues that the creation of positive law, in a republic like ours,
paradigmatically proceeds by legislators positing legal norms that are: (1)
authoritative—because they originated from the elected legislature; (2) prudential—
because the legislators utilized their prudential judgment to solve a societal problem;
and (3) social-ordering—because the laws order the governeds’ lives.59 For the
purposes of this Essay, this conception of the lawmaking process has three attractive
facets: first, it portrays a reasoned process; second, it emphasizes the legislators’
political wisdom; and third, it draws on the legislature’s legitimacy.60 This thin
account contends that originalism is the best interpretative methodology because it
best facilitates these three facets in the context of constitutional interpretation.
Originalism does so by identifying the communication, embodied in law, from the
authoritative lawmaker, to the public.61
My conception of originalism analogizes this picture of positive law’s creation
with the Framing and Ratification that produced the Constitution. The Framing and
Ratification produced the “supreme Law of the Land.”62 It was the result of
prudential judgment.63 From the requisite ninth state’s ratification, the Constitution
ordered—and continues to order—Americans’ lives.64
56
Strang, The Clash of Rival and Incompatible Philosophical Traditions Within
Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 43, at 959.
57

See Strang, Originalism, Nonoriginalist Precedent, and the Common Good, supra note
18, at 455-56 (arguing that my conception of originalism better fits the Preamble than did a
natural rights conception of originalism).
58
Cf. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 212-54 (1993) (distinguishing between public
and nonpublic reasons).
59

Strang, The Clash of Rival and Incompatible Philosophical Traditions Within
Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 43, at 983-92, 998-1001.
60
See Steven D. Smith, Law Without Mind, 88 MICH. L. REV. 104, 117 (1989) (“The
originalist assigns responsibility primarily to legislators, who ordinarily make and express
their decisions in the form of statutes.”).
61

See Larry Alexander, Simple-Minded Originalism, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM,
supra note 12, at 90 (“An intended meaning of an utterance is the uptake the speaker intends
in his audience.”). Cf. Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 27, at 50-59 (arguing that
Gricean “sentence meaning,” appropriately modified, is the best conception of the
Constitution’s original meaning).
62

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.

63

See JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (1840)
(providing a first-hand account of the give-and-take of debate in the Philadelphia
Convention); THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA
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Originalism leverages the three facets I identified earlier—a reasoned process,
legislative wisdom, and democratic legitimacy—by adhering to the Constitution’s
determinate original meaning. Therefore, regardless of one’s conception of the
Good, originalism is more likely to produce the conditions necessary for Americans
to flourish than the alternative, judicial updating.65
The thicker argument tracks the thin argument, and adds the more-robust
substantive claim that the Constitution’s original meaning ensures the background
conditions appropriate to human flourishing. This substantive claim is supportable
both indirectly and directly.
First, indirectly, numerous facets of the Constitution’s history, meaning, and
structure, suggest that the Constitution’s original meaning facilitates human
flourishing. As noted above, the process of Framing and Ratification utilized the
Framers’ and Ratifiers’ wisdom to construct a governmental structure that would
facilitate human flourishing.66 Also, the supermajoritarian processes by which the
Constitution was ratified utilized the American People’s wisdom—and selfinterest—to approve only those governmental structures that would be conducive to
their and their descendants’ flourishing.67 Third, the Constitution’s writtenness itself
both facilitated the creation of a better constitution and preserves that substantively
good constitutional meaning.68
Second, and more directly, the Constitution’s original meaning provides the
conditions for human flourishing because it preserves a robust sphere for ordered
individual freedom vis-á-vis the federal government,69 and it does so in multiple
ways. First, the Constitution’s original meaning protects natural rights.70 Second, the
Constitution’s original meaning preserves individual freedom via limits on federal
power through the constitutional principles of limited and enumerated powers,
separation of powers, check and balances, and federalism.71 Third, the Constitution’s

IN 1787 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., 1836) (summarizing ratification debates on the
Constitution).
64
See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law?, 77 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1, 1 (2001) (concluding that some of the Constitution became law at different
times, but for the most part during the Summer of 1788); see also Owings v. Speed, 18 U.S. (5
Wheat.) 420, 421-23 (1820) (ruling that the Constitution began “operat[ion]” on March 4,
1789).
65

Smith, supra note 60, at 117-18.

66

See supra notes 68-70.

67

U.S. CONST. art. VII, cl. 1.

68

See BARNETT, supra note 15, at 101 (identifying the four functions of writtenness).

69

See id. at 53-60, 72-86, 153-90, 224-73 (arguing that the federal government is
authorized to protect and is limited by natural rights); ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING MEN
MORAL: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC MORALITY 189-227 (1993) (articulating a “pluralist
perfectionist” conception of human freedom); Lee J. Strang, Originalism and Legitimacy, 11
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 657 (2002) (arguing that the federal government is a minimalist state).
70

BARNETT, supra note 15, at 253-69, 274-77.

71

See Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A
Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 326-34 (1993)
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original meaning creates a wide space for democratic processes to operate, both on
the federal and state levels.72 The wide berth originalism provides free human
activity, which is constitutive of human flourishing, is central to its case for
normative attractiveness.
Third, and most directly—and most controversially—the original meaning is also
substantively protective of human flourishing because it protects activities necessary
to human flourishing and does not protect activities not conducive to flourishing.73
For instance, the Constitution protects the freedom of speech,74 but it does not
protect abortion from government restriction.75 To make a persuasive case for this
claim would require a detailed “cashing-out” of the Constitution’s original meaning,
which is beyond the scope of this Essay.76
C. Key Characteristics
Originalism also promises that, unlike alternative interpretative methods, it
makes sense of the Constitution’s key features. I discussed some of those features,
such as the Constitution’s writtenness, above, in Parts I and II.B.2. Here, I have in
mind the key facet of American constitutional law: the centrality of one particular
written document that originated at one particular time.77 This fact is so deeply
entrenched that, even when it is implausible, the Supreme Court claims that it is
doing the Constitution’s bidding, not the Court’s.78
The document that begins “We the People of the United States,”79 currently
located in Rotunda for the Charters of Freedom in the National Archives,80 and

(summarizing the Necessary and Proper Clause’s role in maintaining the Constitution’s
structural principles).
72
See Strang, The Clash of Rival and Incompatible Philosophical Traditions Within
Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 43, at 981-83 (summarizing the robust role for
democratic processes within originalism).
73

See Strang, Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism?, supra note 8, at 285-87
(“Originalism, applied to the American Constitution, regularly results in conservative
outputs.”).
74

U.S. CONST., amend. I.

75

See Strang, Originalism, Nonoriginalist Precedent, and the Common Good, supra note
18, at 482-83 (summarizing the literature).
76

See Strang, Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism?, supra note 8, at 279-87
(suggesting that the alignment of liberal legal academics and nonoriginalism and conservativelibertarian legal academics and originalism is evidence that originalism leads to conservative
results).
77
See Richard S. Kay, American Constitutionalism, in CONSTITUTIONALISM:
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS 31 (Larry Alexander ed. 1998) (“What commands obedience is
not a mere set of words, but the expression of an intentional historical-political act.”); Green,
supra note 31, at 1614 (concluding that “this Constitution” refers to “historically situated
Constitution that . . . receives meaning at the time of the Founding”).
78

See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 440 (2000) (“Miranda is
constitutionally based”); id. at 444 (“Miranda announced a constitutional rule”).
79

U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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commonly known as the Constitution of the United States, is the ultimate source of
American constitutional law.81 This particular document possesses a unique
provenance:82 it arrived in the Archives’ Rotunda because it is the only document
that went through the Framing and Ratification process.83
The Framing and Ratification process was Americans’ response to the problems
presented by the Articles of Confederation.84 The process drew on Americans’
wisdom, resolved and compromised contentious issues, and provided the framework
for American society.85 The Constitution bears the marks—both good86 and ill87—of
that process.
Originalism places this specific document at the heart of the interpretative
enterprise. All conceptions of originalism share the fundamental disposition to treat
the document’s original meaning as the sole source of determinate constitutional
meaning.88 Originalism’s attitude of faithfulness of the United States Constitution
shows in many ways. To take a counter-intuitive piece of evidence, nonoriginalists
frequently criticize originalism for its failure to reach normatively acceptable
results.89 I think this criticism is overblown90 but, accepting its cogency for purposes

80

National Archives, Rotunda for the Charters of Freedom, available
http://www.archives.gov/museum/visit/rotunda.html (last visited July 28, 2014).

at

81
See also Donald Drakeman, What’s the Point of Originalism?, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 1123, 1125 (2014) (describing the results of a survey that indicated that 90% of
Americans believe that the Constitution’s original meaning should play a role in Supreme
Court interpretations, and two-thirds citing the Framers’ intent as the most important source of
that meaning).
82

See Joseph Raz, On the Authority and Interpretations of Constitutions: Some
Preliminaries, in CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 77, at 158
(“[T]he identity of the lawmaker is material to the validity of the law, at least in the case of
enacted law.”).
83

National Archives, The Constitution of the United States: A History, available at
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_history.html (last visited Aug. 20,
2014).
84

Strang, The Clash of Rival and Incompatible Philosophical Traditions Within
Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 43, at 951-57 (summarizing this process).
85
FORREST MCDONALD, E PLURIBUS UNUM: THE FORMATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
1776-1790, at 259-371 (2d ed. 1979).
86
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted . . . .”)
(anchoring the principle of limited and enumerated powers).
87

See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges . . . shall hold their Offices during good
Behaviour . . . .”) (providing the basis for presumptive life tenure of federal judges).
88

See Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 27, at 2-4 (describing the fixation thesis).

89

William P. Marshall, Progressive Constitutionalism, Originalism, and the Significance
of Landmark Decisions in Evaluating Constitutional Theory, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1251, 1251-52
(2011); see also Joel K. Goldstein, Constitutional Change, Originalism, and the Vice
Presidency, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 369, 376 n.22 (2013) (listing sources making this claim).
90
Cf. Strang, Originalism and the “Challenge of Change,” supra note 21, at 992 (arguing
that, based on originalism’s demonstrated ability to change operative constitutional doctrine in
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of this argument, originalists should “bite the bullet” and agree with the criticism:
originalism cannot deliver “Our Perfect Constitution.”91 Instead, originalism’s
inability to always deliver normatively attractive results shows that originalism is
wedded to our actual written—and fallible—Constitution. For instance, Article III
requires presumptive lifetime tenure for federal judges, and this is normatively
unattractive.92 Similarly, the Due Process Clauses’ do not protect the right to life of
unborn human beings,93 and this injustice should be rectified through constitutional
amendment.94
Of course, we should expect that a human artifact, such as the Constitution—
especially a constitution!—is95 imperfect.96 Originalism fits this fact. Originalism’s
fidelity to our historically-conditioned Constitution is in stark contrast to the core
nonoriginalist claim: the Constitution’s original meaning is one argument among
many, and that other “modalities” of constitutional argumentation, including baldly
normative ones, may limit or displace the Constitution’s determinate original
meaning.97 For instance, Professor Mitchell Berman recently argued that current
popular constitutional judgments on the Natural Born Citizenship Clause undermine
originalism.98
Originalism’s pride-of-place for written Constitution also enables originalism to
emphasize many of the Constitution’s other key characteristics. For example, Article
V provides a mechanism to amend the Constitution. Article III authorizes federal
judges to exercise “judicial Power,” the power to decide cases and controversies.99
response to societal change, originalism’s critics bear the burden of showing where
originalism failed to meet the challenge of change, and that its failure to do so counts it out as
a viable method of constitutional interpretation).
91

See Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1981)
(describing the aspiration of nonoriginalist legal academics to create “Our Perfect
Constitution” through creative judicial updating).
92

See Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life
Tenure Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 769, 771 (2006) (“We believe the
American constitutional rule granting life tenure to Supreme Court Justices is fundamentally
flawed.”).
93

See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized . . . .”) (emphasis
added); see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 979, 980 (1992)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Constitution says absolutely nothing about it.”).
94

See Strang, Originalism, Nonoriginalist Precedent, and the Common Good, supra note
18, at 483-84 (describing Roe and the abortions it licenses as unjust).
95

Or may become so, in light of changed conditions. Kay, supra note 77, at 34.

96

See id. at 32 (“[T]hose rules do not represent the optimum arrangements that might be
imagined . . . .”).
97
See BOBBITT, supra note 10, at 11-22 (providing a list of six modalities of constitutional
interpretation).
98
Mitchell N. Berman, Reflective Equilibrium and Constitutional Method: Lessons from
John McCain and the Natural-Born Citizenship Clause, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM:
THEORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 12, at 261-77.
99
See Saikrishna Prakash & John Yoo, Against Interpretative Supremacy, 103 MICH. L.
REV. 1539, 1541 (2005) (book review) (“Judicial review is merely the means by which federal
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The thin text of Article III does not indicate a power to update the Constitution using
nonoriginalist modalities. This compliments Article V100 by preserving the attendant
benefits of the amendment process, which are otherwise undermined by judicial
updating via nonoriginalist precedent.101
D. Judicial Capacity
Third, originalism promises to fit judges’ competences. Federal judges are at the
center of American constitutional interpretation.102 A plausible theory of
constitutional interpretation must both play to the strengths of these judges and
respect their limited capacities.
Originalism respects federal judges’ capacities. Originalism asks federal judges
to ascertain and to apply the Constitution’s original meaning and originalist
precedent.103 Both tasks are within federal judges’ competency.
Starting with the latter first, federal judges, like all lawyers, are trained to be
adept at working with precedent. Indeed, this proposition is so uncontroversial that a
school of constitutional interpretation has emerged called common law
constitutionalism.104 Originalism similarly prescribes that precedent should dominate
judges’ decision-making processes in our mature legal system.105 Originalist judges’
initial inclination is to find the relevant precedent and apply it.106
Federal judges also possess the capacity to ascertain and apply the Constitution’s
original meaning.107 Originalism’s focal case asks judges to ascertain and apply the
Constitution’s original meaning. This requires judges to ascertain the text’s
conventional meaning, when it was ratified. This is a task that lawyers are trained to
do in a host of areas including statutory and administrative law. This is a task federal
judges have the resources to do well. They have access to the pertinent constitutional
text, structure, Framing and Ratification debates, and larger societal debates, to

judges implement the Constitution’s higher authority in the course of deciding cases or
controversies.”).
100
See PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 2 (2008) (arguing that judicial power
is the authority “to decide in accord with the law of the land”).
101

See MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 29, at 85-94 (cataloguing the negative
consequences of judicial updating).
102

See DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 12 (“[P]ractice has now settled that courts do have a
responsibility to declare and act on their best understanding of what the Constitution
forbids.”).
103

See Strang, The Privileged Place of Originalist Precedent, supra note 21 at, 1729, 1731
(describing the robust role of precedent in originalism).
104

E.g., DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010).

105

Strang, The Privileged Place of Originalist Precedent, supra note 21, at 1786-88.

106

Id.

107

Critics have questioned originalism’s ability to deliver on these promises. See, e.g., Eric
Berger, Originalism’s Pretenses, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 329, 331 (2013) (“[O]riginalism often
cannot fulfill its promises of fixation and constraint.”). In a future article, I hope to address
these sorts of criticisms in depth.
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ascertain the text’s conventional meaning.108 Also, judges’ jobs are made easier from
the wealth of originalist scholarship that has proliferated over the past three decades,
and continues to be refined.109 Furthermore, judges have access to computer-assisted
research technologies to help them (and scholars) ascertain the Constitution’s
original meaning.110
This is unlike nonoriginalism, which asks lawyers to, for example: (1) choose the
morally best ruling (Dworkin);111 or (2) ascertain the “popular constitutional
meaning” (Kramer);112 or (3) choose the most economically efficient rule (Posner);113
or (4) pick the legal scholar’s favorite value(s) that judges should maximize.114 For
none of these tasks are federal judges especially trained or institutionally suited.
III. ORIGINALISM’S LIMITS
A. Introduction
Originalism is subject to significant constraints; I describe three below. In the
end, however, I briefly conclude that, despite—and, in part, because of—these
constraints, originalism remains the best method of constitutional interpretation.
B. An Imperfect Constitution
First, originalism’s promise that it provides a more normatively attractive picture
of constitutional interpretation than other methods, though true, does not mean that
originalism provides a “perfect” Constitution.115 There are instances where,
regardless of one’s ethical commitments, the Constitution’s original meaning is
unjust or at least imprudent.116 From my own perspective, the Constitution’s failure
to include unborn human beings within its protection from public and publiclysanctioned violence is a grave defect. Similarly, the Constitution’s conferral of

108

See, e.g., Constitution Society, www.constitution.org (last visited Aug. 20, 2014)
(providing access to a plethora of relevant sources).
109
See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 605-19 (2008) (reflecting heavy
reliance on originalist scholarship).
110

See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of the Original Meaning of the Commerce
Clause, 55 ARK. L. REV. 847, 856-63 (2003) (utilizing computer-assisted research techniques
to confirm the original meaning of “Commerce”).
111

DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 2.

112

LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
JUDICIAL REVIEW 149 (2005).
113

E.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS
(1999).
114

See Monaghan, supra note 91.

115

Id.

OF

MORAL

AND

AND

LEGAL THEORY 240-64

116

One of the manifestations of this is the widespread claim by nonoriginalists that
nonoriginalist precedent undermines originalism, which is partially premised on the
proposition that the nonoriginalist precedents in question are just. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra
note 10, at 12-13 (pointing to Brown as an example).
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presumptive life-tenure on federal judges may at one time have made sense, but does
not make sense today, for a host of reasons.117
That being said, for many reasons I listed earlier—the Framing and Ratification
process’s utilization of the Framers’ and Ratifiers’ prudential judgment, the
supermajoritarian process by which the Constitution was adopted that harnessed the
American People’s prudential judgment and self-interest, the democratic processes
the Constitution fosters, and the substance of the original meaning itself—I believe
that originalism creates a better state of affairs than the alternatives. Indeed, as I
argued above, originalism’s failure to deliver a perfect constitution is one of its
virtues.
C. No Answer for Some Constitutional Questions
Second, though originalism paints the Constitution’s text in a positive light, the
Constitution’s text is limited; it does not answer all constitutional questions.
Originalists have described three major ways in which the original meaning’s force
is limited.
First, many originalists have adopted the concept of constitutional
construction.118 Constitutional construction occurs when the Constitution’s original
meaning does not answer a constitutional question; the original meaning may narrow
the universe of possible answers, but it leaves the interpreter with choice.119 These
originalists have concluded that the Constitution’s original meaning is
underdetermined in at least some situations120: it does not answer all interpretative
questions.121 That is because these originalists focus on the constitutional text’s
original meaning—its conventional meaning, when it was ratified.122
This move toward original public meaning originalism has the benefit of
avoiding the criticism that originalism is impossible in principle, or too difficult as a
practical matter.123 However, it also has the side-effect of narrowing the thickness
and breadth of the Constitution’s meaning, with the result that the Constitution’s
original meaning is more likely to be underdetermined.124
In these situations—when the Constitution’s original meaning is
underdetermined—I have elsewhere argued that federal judges must defer to the

117

Calabresi & Lindgren, supra note 92, at 769.

118

See Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
375, 403-04 (2013) (providing the current state of the scholarship on this point).
119

See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999) (providing the seminal discussion of construction).
120

AND

Strang, Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism?, supra note 8, at 272-74.

121

But see Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 479, 483 (2013) (defining construction more broadly as “the determination of
the legal content and legal effect produced by a legal text” even when the legal text
determines the content and effect).
122

Id. at 497-98.

123

BARNETT, supra note 15, at 95-96.

124

Strang, Originalism and the Aristotelian Tradition, supra note 14, at 2008-09.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol63/iss1/8

16

2014]

ORIGINALISM’S PROMISE

97

elected branches’ constitutional constructions.125 This is likely a significant limit on
originalism, depending on how many constitutional questions are interpretative or
constructive. The relative quantity of construction is an empirical question that must
be answered on a case-by-case, doctrine-by-doctrine basis, and there is little
discussion among scholars on this point.126 My tentative view is that many of the
most important constitutional questions currently debated between originalists and
nonoriginalists, are issues of interpretation, and not construction.127
Second, some originalists have argued that the Constitution requires
nonoriginalist precedent to trump the Constitution’s original meaning in some
situations.128 These originalists have found that the original meaning of “judicial
Power” in Article III requires federal judges to give precedent—including
nonoriginalist precedent—“significant respect.”129 I argued elsewhere that federal
judges should utilize three factors to determine when to refrain from overruling
nonoriginalist precedent.130
This has the potential to be a significant limit on originalism. My tentative view
is that at least some of the most important nonoriginalist precedents should be
preserved because such important cases will frequently implicate two of the three
factors, reliance and “nonlegal justness.” These precedents will implicate reliance
because their importance was frequently “cashed out” in Americans’ reliance on
them. Also, the Supreme Court was frequently drawn toward a nonoriginalist result
because of the perceived justness of the result. For example, in what is perhaps the
most significant departure from the Constitution’s original meaning,131 the Supreme
Court, in Home Building and Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell,132 narrowly interpreted the
Contracts Clause because of the perceived justice of impairing the mortgage
contracts in question.133 Blaisdell has become one of the cornerstones of the modern

125

Lee J. Strang, The Role of the Common Good in Legal and Constitutional
Interpretation, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 48, 70-72 (2005).
126
But see Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, supra note 121, at 483
(describing the category of construction as relatively very large).
127

Here, I have in mind debates such as those over the scope of Congress’ Commerce
Clause power, or whether the Due Process Clauses require the states and federal government
to permit abortion, or whether the Establishment Clause prohibits public religious displays.
128
MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 29, at 175-96; Kurt Lash, Originalism, Popular
Sovereignty, and Reverse Stare Decisis, 93 VA. L. REV. 1437 (2007); Strang, Originalism,
Nonoriginalist Precedent, and the Common Good, supra note 18, at 419.
129
Strang, Originalism, Nonoriginalist Precedent, and the Common Good, supra note 18,
at 420.
130

Id. at 472.

131
See JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY: THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 67-68 (2005) (describing Blaisdell as counter to the paradigm case of
what the Contracts Clause prohibited).
132

Home Bldg. and Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).

133

See RUBENFELD, supra note 131, at 68 (identifying this argument).
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regulatory state because it permits significant state regulation of private economic
life.134
Third, originalism concerns only the Constitution’s original meaning; therefore,
it has nothing to say about other subjects. For instance, the original meaning does not
tell us whether states had the power to secede from the Union (prior to the Civil
War).135 This was because the nature of the Constitution—was it a pact of states, or a
covenant entered into by one national people?—is not answerable by the
Constitution’s original meaning. Therefore, outside of the Constitution’s original
meaning, originalism has no import.
D. Pressuring Judges
Originalism puts pressure on judicial competence in at least three areas: first,
ascertaining the Constitution’s original meaning; second, constructing constitutional
meaning; and, third, determining whether to overrule or limit nonoriginalist
precedent. Because of this pressure, originalism has to be prudent about its
expectations of judges’ ability to consistently produce accurate results
First, ascertaining the Constitution’s original meaning exerts pressure on judicial
competence. As my fellow Symposium Contributor, Mr. Charles, reminded us,
judges are not historians136—though, luckily, originalism is not history. Judges must
have the intelligence, time, access to resources and scholarship—and disposition—to
investigate and articulate the Constitution’s publicly understood meaning at the time
of ratification. Not every judge will possess these characteristics, at least not
sufficiently, to always “get it right.” Therefore, even assuming good faith, originalist
judges will “get it wrong” on occasion.
Second, constructing constitutional meaning applies pressure on judicial
competence.137 When the Constitution’s original meaning is underdetermined, judges
must possess the requisite characteristics to know that the original meaning has in
fact “run out.” They must also possess the characteristics to properly create
constitutional doctrine that will advance the common good. These are challenging
tasks. Therefore, even assuming good faith, originalist judges will “get it wrong” on
occasion.
Third, determining whether to overrule or limit nonoriginalist precedent also
pressures judicial competence. I argued elsewhere that the original meaning of
“judicial Power” requires federal judges to give nonoriginalist precedent “significant
respect,” and that this requires federal judges to utilizes three factors to decide
134

Douglas W. Kmiec & John O. McGinnis, The Contract Clause: A Return to the
Original Understanding, 1 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 525, 544 (1987); Richard A. Epstein, Toward a
Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 735-38 (1984) (“Blaisdell . . .
paved the way for massive government intervention.”).
135
Lee J. Strang, Originalism’s Limits: Interposition, Nullification, and Secession, in
UNION AND STATES’ RIGHTS: A HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION OF INTERPOSITION,
NULLIFICATION, AND SECESSION 150 YEARS AFTER SUMTER 204, 214-15 (Neil H. Cogan, ed.,
2014).
136
Patrick J. Charles, History in Law, Mythmaking, and Constitutional Legitimacy, 63
CLEV. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming Nov. 2014).
137

See Strang, Originalism and the Aristotelian Tradition, supra note 14, at 2036-37
(describing this).
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whether to overrule nonoriginalist precedent.138 The three factors are: (1) to what
extent does the nonoriginalist precedent deviate from the original meaning?; (2) to
what extent, if any, would overruling the precedent harm Rule of Law values?; and
(3) the nonlegal justness of the precedent.139 Both the identification of which
precedents are nonoriginalist, and determining whether the three factors council
overruling a particular precedent, will require judges with the right character and
capacities.140 Not every judge will possess these characteristics, at least not
sufficiently to always “get it right.” Therefore, even assuming good faith, originalist
judges will “get it wrong” on occasion.
Elsewhere, I argued that, because of these pressures on judges, originalism must
incorporate virtue ethics into its conception of judicial selection and judging.141 For
example, judges facing nonoriginalist precedent will need the virtue of justice-aslawfulness so that they have the disposition to follow the law—the Constitution’s
original meaning—and not succumb to the nonoriginalist precedent’s perceived
normative attractiveness.142 Incorporating virtue ethics into originalism will enable it
to identify those people who are well-suited for judging, and help foster those
characteristics necessary to originalist judging. Originalism, supplemented by virtue
ethics, despite the pressures it places on judges’ capacities, has the ability to meet its
goals, at least better than nonoriginalist alternatives.143
IV. ORIGINALISM RETAINS ITS PROMISE (IN PART) BECAUSE OF ITS LIMITS
Acknowledging these limits to originalism, its promises continue to hold true.
Originalism promises: (1) normatively attractive results—though not perfection; (2)
fit with key facets of the Constitution—though the Constitution’s original meaning is
limited; and (3) respect for the competence of judges—though judges are likely to
fail at the originalist enterprise, at least some of the time.
Each of the three limits to originalism’s promise described above share the
characteristic that one should expect from a human enterprise, such as judges144
interpreting the United States Constitution145: limitedness. The Constitution is
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posited human law crafted by humans at particular times to achieve particular
purposes,146 and judges interpreting it are likewise limited humans.147 Therefore, the
Constitution and judicial interpretation are limited, and one should not expect it to
achieve normative perfection,148 or answer all legal questions, or authorize federal
judges to utilize tremendous power.149
Originalism’s promises, appropriately limited, fit the Constitution’s positedness.
It promises attainable normatively attractive results, faithfulness to the actual
Constitution, and respect for judicial limits. These are modest promises. And,
because they are modest, originalism is able to “deliver” on those promises. In sum,
it is only through recognizing its limits that originalism is able to achieve its promise
of legitimate interpretation.
V. CONCLUSION
In this brief Essay, I described what I take to be the three primary facets of
originalism that make it a better interpretative methodology than alternatives. I
argued that originalism promises relatively more normatively attractive
constitutional interpretation, fit with the Constitution’s key characteristics, and
respect for judicial capacities. I also acknowledged that originalism labors under
limits, including less-than-ideal constitutional interpretations, limited constitutional
meaning, and occasional judicial failure. Lastly, I noted that originalism’s limits
argue in its favor because they reflect the limited nature of the Constitution and the
humans who crafted and interpret it.
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